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Abstract: This article challenges the
common view that improvements in
critical thinking are best pursued by
investigations in informal logic.
From the perspective of research in
psychology and neuroscience, human inference is a process that is
multimodal, parallel, and often emotional, which makes it unlike the
linguistic, serial, and narrowly cognitive structure of arguments. Attempts to improve inferential practice need to consider psychological
error tendencies, which are patterns
of thinking that are natural for people but frequently lead to mistakes in
judgment. This article discusses two
important but neglected error tendencies: motivated inference and
fear-driven inference.

Résumé: Nous mettons en question
le point de vue courant que
l’amélioration de la pensée critique
se
réalise
le
mieux
par
l’enseignement de la logique non
formelle. Selon les recherches en
psychologie et en neuroscience,
l’inférence consiste de plusieurs
procédés parallèles souvent affectifs,
ce qui diffère de la structure cognitive linguistique, successive, et
étroite des arguments. Les tentatives
d’améliorer les inférences doivent
tenir compte des tendances psychologiques à commettre des erreurs
qui sont le résultat des façons de
penser naturelles qui induisent souvent les gens à former des mauvais
jugements. On discute de deux erreurs importantes mais négligées :
les inférences influencées par la motivation, et celles influencées par la
peur.

Keywords: Argument, critical thinking, emotion, fear-driven inference, inference, logic, motivated inference, neuroscience, psychology.

1. Introduction
The investigation of critical thinking includes the systematic attempt to improve people’s ability to form beliefs and make decisions. It is widely taken for granted among philosophers that
such improvement is best accomplished by the study of argument as pursued within the fields of formal and informal logic.
This article draws on findings in psychology and neuroscience
to challenge this assumption. Because human inference is very
different from linguistic argument, we can get a better under© Paul Thagard. Informal Logic, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2011), pp. 152-170.
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standing of the failures of thinking by attending to psychological
processes than by analyzing logical fallacies, only a few of
which are relevant to the kinds of thinking errors that people actually make.
I begin with a discussion of how, from a neurocognitive
perspective, inference is very different from argument. I argue
accordingly that rationality should be understood as a matter of
making effective inferences, not just good arguments. Correlatively, irrationality involves making erroneous inferences for
reasons that go well beyond the employment of fallacious arguments. Rather, inferential mistakes arise from a host of psychological error tendencies (biases). This article will concentrate on
two error tendencies that have been largely neglected in informal logic: motivated inference and fear-driven inference. The
second of these has also been ignored in psychological discussions of inferential errors, even though it is common in many
domains such as interpersonal relationships, health, politics, and
economics. After an assessment of the relevance of psychology
to the enhancement of scientific literacy, I conclude with a brief
discussion of how the study of argument can be socially useful.
2. Inference and argument
When I first started teaching informal logic in the late 1970s, I
had the common hope that I would be helping students to improve their thinking. Now as then, the need for critical thinking
is acute. A large proportion of the North American population
believes that global warming is not a problem, that humans did
not evolve from apes, that the moon landing was a hoax (Plait
2002), and even that the earth is the center of the universe. People also make many bad decisions, such as smoking, overeating,
paying exorbitant interest on their credit card purchases, and
voting for politicians who do not act in their interests. Enterprises such as informal logic, critical thinking, and scientific literacy aim at improving such kinds of theoretical inferences
(about what to believe) and practical inferences (about what to
do). I shall argue, however, that evidence from psychology and
neuroscience reveals that standard approaches are based on misconceptions about the nature of inference and argument. By
inference I mean the activity of forming mental representations
such as beliefs and decisions.
Here is what seems to me to be a common view in philosophy about the relation between critical thinking and informal logic:
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(1) arguments are the basis for belief formation and decision
making;
(2) good arguments are the basis of rational belief formation
and decision making; and
(3) fallacious arguments are the causes of defects in beliefs
and decisions.
These three assume that inferences are based on arguments, so
that it should be possible to improve human inference by increasing people’s ability to construct and evaluate good arguments while avoiding fallacious ones. Rationality primarily involves using good arguments and identifying bad ones.
The point of this article is to defend an alternative view
based on evidence that inference is in fact very different from
argument, so that critical thinking needs to proceed in ways that
are much more informed by psychological research than by informal logic. In place of fallacies, many of which are arcane and
rarely committed by people in real situations, the study of critical thinking can consider error tendencies to which people are
actually prone, as shown by empirical investigation.
In the philosophical tradition, an argument consists of a set
of claims in which the premises offer reasons for a conclusion
(Govier 2005; for a broader view of argument, see Johnson
2000). Since Aristotle invented the syllogism, arguments have
been laid out in the form of a set of sentences from which a conclusion is derived, either deductively with no loss of certainty or
inductively (ampliatively). Typically, arguments are linguistic
entities, consisting of a set of sentences that are laid out serially,
in step by step fashion: premise 1, premise 2, … premise n;
therefore conclusion. If inference were the same as argument, it
would have the same serial, linguistic structure.
However, there is ample evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience that human inference is actually parallel
rather than serial, multimodal rather than just language-based,
and as much emotional as cognitive. Here “parallel” means that
the brain carries out many processes simultaneously, “multimodal” means that the representations used by the brain include
non-linguistic ones such as visual images, and “emotional”
means neural processes that integrate evaluations with physiological perceptions. These expositions assume, as do almost all
psychologists and neuroscientists, that mental processes are
brain operations; detailed defense of this assumption can be
found in Thagard (2010a).
It would take much more than an article to defend thoroughly the claims that inference is parallel, multimodal, and
emotional, but support for them can be found in any recent textbook in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (e.g. Smith
and Kosslyn 2007; Thagard 2005b). The fact that inference is

Informal Logic and Neuropsychological Perspectives 155
parallel rather than serial can be seen first from the operation of
the human brain, which involves around 100 billion neurons firing asynchronously. Conscious thinking is largely serial because
the limitations of working memory only allow people to form
one thought at a time, but the formation of these thoughts is the
result of a massively parallel process that integrates many
sources of information (see e.g. Rumelhart and McClelland
1986; Thagard 2000).
Some philosophical recognition of the parallel nature of
inference is shown in the discussion of conductive arguments
(Govier 2005), which assemble multiple sources of information.
From a psychological perspective, all inference is conductive,
operating in parallel to lead to the assembly of many sources of
information into a coherent conclusion. As Gilbert Harman
(1973) pointed out long ago, even a deductive argument does
not suffice to justify making an inference. Believing that if p
then q, and p, need not lead you to believe that q, if you already
have reasons to doubt that q. In that case, you need to question
your belief in if p then q and p, rather than blithely inferring q.
Inference in such cases requires a more complex process of belief revision based on coherence, rather than merely following
the deductive pattern (Thagard 2000; Thagard and Findlay
2011).
The sources of information that justify inferences often
involve linguistic processing, but they also often require processing of information in multiple other modalities, including vision, sound, touch, taste, smell, and kinesthetic sensations.
There has been some recognition of this fact in the informal logic literature on visual argument (e.g. Groarke 1996), but I think
it would be better to use the term “visual inference” rather than
argument in order to avoid the serial, linguistic connotations of
argument. Psychological evidence that thinking is multimodal
can be found in the work of psychologists such as Barsalou
(1999, 2009).
In inference, emotion is just as important as cognition, because the brain uses emotions to attach values to representations,
which are crucial for decision making and even important for
deciding which beliefs are worth forming (Thagard, 2006,
2010a). Emotion is not just an add-on or distraction to cognition,
but an integral part of how the brain controls the flow of information (Clore and Palmer 2009).
The evidence that inference is multimodal, parallel, and
emotional as well as cognitive has serious implications for the
study of critical thinking. Instead of assuming that inference is
and should be based on serial, linguistic arguments, we need to
consider the complex processes that sometimes enable people to
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succeed at producing reliable beliefs and effective decisions, yet
sometimes mislead people into erroneous beliefs and disastrous
decisions. From this perspective, rationality is not simply a matter of using good arguments and avoiding fallacious ones, but
rather a matter of adopting patterns of thinking and behavior that
best satisfy legitimate goals concerning what to believe and
what to do.
In addition to fallacies, we need to consider inferential error tendencies: thinking patterns to which people are naturally
prone but which often lead to false beliefs and actions contrary
to people’s best interests. In the appendix, I list more than fifty
such error tendencies derived from the psychological literature,
all of which I have found relevant to teaching critical thinking.
In this article, however, I will focus on just two error tendencies,
motivated inference and fear-driven inference. The first of these
is well known in the psychological literature but largely neglected in philosophical treatments of critical thinking; the second is little discussed in both psychology and philosophy, despite its prevalence in erroneous thinking.
3. Motivated Inference
Motivated inference occurs when people distort their judgments
because of their underlying personal goals (Kunda, 1990, 1999).
It is an emotional bias that undercuts rationality, and can be observed in many kinds of interpersonal and practical judgments.
It would be highly misleading to depict motivated inference as a
sort of fallacious argument akin to wishful thinking, of the form:
I want X, therefore X is true. Few people are that that simpleminded, not even the proponents of the The Secret (Byrne 2006)
who propose that just wanting something can enable you to get
it. Motivated inference is more complex than wishful thinking
because it involves selective recruitment and assessment of evidence based on unconscious processes that are driven by emotional considerations of goals rather than purely cognitive reasoning.
Here are some examples of motivated inference found in
diverse domains:
Romantic relationships: my lover treats me poorly, but he/she
will change.
Parenting: my child hates school, but will settle down and
straighten out eventually.
Medicine: this pain in my chest must be indigestion, not a
heart attack.
Politics: the new leader will be the country’s savior, bringing
hope and change.
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Sports: our team has been losing, but we’re going to play
great today.
Research: the article I’m writing is my best ever and will get
into a top journal.
Law: the evidence against my hero is serious, but he couldn’t
have done it.
Religion: life is hard, but my caring God will lead me to eternal bliss.
Economics: this rapid economic growth is a sign of a new
kind of economy, not a bubble.
In all of these cases, inference is based on limited evidence but
seems plausible to people because the conclusion fits well with
their goals such as being loved, healthy, successful, happy, or
rich. Of course, the conclusions of motivated inference may occasionally turn out to be true, because sometimes lovers do
change, children do straighten out, and so on. But motivated inference is based on wishes, not facts.
It would be pointless to try to capture these inferences by
obviously fallacious arguments, because people are rarely consciously aware of the biases that result from their motivations.
Mathematical decision theory makes a sharp distinction between
probabilities and utilities; but, in the human brain, the processes
for assessing beliefs and values overlap substantially (Harris,
Sheth, and Cohen 2008). Psychologists have documented many
phenomena that are best explained by noting that emotion affects people’s judgements about risk and credibility. See, for
example Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) on risk
as feelings, Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) on
the affect heuristic, and Schwartz and Clore (2003) on mood as
information. Hence motivated inference naturally results from
unconscious mental processes, rather than from explicit reasoning.
Overcoming people’s motivated inferences is therefore
more akin to psychotherapy than informal logic. Rather than
laying out premises and conclusions, remediation of motivated
inference requires identification of conscious and unconscious
goals that can explain why people are inclined to adopt beliefs
despite a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. For example, I have used a psychological theory of motivated inference
implemented as a computer model to explain the prevalence of
religious belief (Thagard 2005a), the opposition to Darwin’s
theory of evolution (Thagard and Findlay 2010) and the persistence of skepticism about global warming (Thagard and Findlay
2011). Because the evidence for God and the evidence against
Darwin and global warming are insufficient to support reason-

158

Paul Thagard

able belief, their attractiveness can best be explained by motivated inference.
Due to their unconscious, parallel nature, motivated inferences are often better displayed using diagrams rather than a series of statements. Figure 1 shows part of the cognitive and emotional structure of the view held by right wing politicians and oil
company executives that scientific concerns about climate
change are exaggerated. Most scientists have concluded on the
basis of substantial evidence that global warming is caused by
human production of greenhouse gases, but the skeptics deny
this interpretation of the evidence. According to the analysis in
figure 1, this denial results, not from any identifiable argument,
but from a mixture of evidence and emotional motivations such
as avoiding restrictions on oil companies and limiting government activity. Then climate change skepticism results from emotional coherence, not fallacious arguments. Hence in cases such
as the politically-motivated denial of climate change and the religiously-motivated denial of the theory of evolution by natural
selection, critical thinking requires a psychological understanding of motivated inference more than a logical understanding of
the structure of argument.
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Figure 1. View of the controversy over climate change including emotional constraints as well as explanatory ones. The solid
lines indicate positive constraints based on explanatory relations
and the thin dotted line indicates a negative constraint based on
incompatibility. The thick dotted lines indicate negative emotional constraints. Reprinted from Thagard and Findlay (2011).

Although there has been substantial research on motivated
inference in psychology, it rarely is considered in textbooks on
critical thinking and scientific literacy. Even more neglected is
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another kind of emotion-related inference that derives from fear
rather than desire.
4. Fear-Driven Inference
In fear-driven inference, people believe something, not just despite the fact they fear it to be true, but partly because they fear
it to be true (Thagard and Nussbaum forthcoming). Motivated
inference leads people to believe what they desire because it fits
with their goals, but fear-driven inference seems paradoxical
because people end up believing what they are afraid of. How
can anyone be that stupid?
Easily. Here are important domains in which people (including the author of this paper) sometimes succumb to feardriven inference.
Romantic relationships: my lover looks distant, so he/she
must be having an affair.
Parenting: I haven’t heard from my teenager for a few hours,
so he’s probably in trouble.
Medicine: this rash means I have leprosy or some other serious disease.
Politics: today’s tough times result from an international conspiracy.
Sports: my team is hopeless.
Research: the editor’s delay in responding to my article
means he/she hates it.
Law: the courts are so biased that I’m bound to be convicted.
Religion: it is predetermined that God will punish me eternally.
Economics: the economy is doomed to perpetual recession
and depression.
What I am calling “fear-driven inference” has occasionally been
noticed before: Mele (2001) calls it “twisted self-deception”,
and Elster (2007) calls it “countermotivated” inference. But this
kind of inference does not seem to have been investigated by
experimental psychologists or writers on critical thinking.
Fear-driven inference is doubly irrational, from both a
practical and theoretical perspective, because it gives the thinker
unhappiness as well as erroneous beliefs. It is even less suited to
argument-based analysis than motivated inference, because it
results from complex psychological processes that are emotional
and parallel, not just linguistic, serial, and conscious. Thagard
and Nussbaum (forthcoming) propose that fear-driven inference
results from a process they call gut overreaction, in which an
amplifying feedback loop between judgments and emotions can
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lead both to excessively positive assessments and to excessively
negative ones. Fearing that something is true (e.g. that you have
a disease) can lead you to focus so much on the reasons for it
(e.g. a rash, which might be transitory) that the mere arousal associated with the belief is mistaken for evidence that it is true.
How can people be susceptible to both motivated and feardriven inference? The first makes people overly optimistic,
while the latter makes people overly pessimistic. Which direction someone is biased at a particular moment can depend on
several factors, including personality, mood, and evidence.
Some people may be more naturally inclined toward motivated
inference if they have high self-esteem and a positive outlook on
life. On the other hand, people inclined to depression and low
self-esteem may be more inclined to fear-driven inference.
Apart from personality factors, all people have variations in
moods, and those in a happy mood at a moment may tend toward motivated inference, while those in a negative mood may
tend toward fear-driven inference. Finally, the accumulation of
evidence may produce a swing from motivated inference to feardriven inference when people lose the ability to sustain an excessively rosy view of the world. For example, in the economic
crisis of 2008, investors quickly switched from an overoptimistic view to an excessively pessimistic one, causing a sharp drop
in the stock market. Going in the other direction, events such as
the Arab spring of 2011 can lead people to swing from a pessimistic view about the possibilities of democratic change towards
an overly exuberant one concerning the possibility of revolution.
Thagard and Nussbaum (forthcoming) conjecture that
fear-driven inference arises for much the same reasons as motivated inference. In the brain, there is no firewall between cognition and emotion, with many interconnections among the brain
areas responsible for belief assessment and option evaluation.
These interconnections have been crucially effective for enabling organisms to operate efficiently to survive and reproduce,
but may lead to errors in the more complex world that people
now inhabit. Valuing a situation as extremely desirable or undesirable may produce a high degree of attention that is easily confused with a high degree of credibility.
As with motivated inference, the best way to avoid destructive fear-driven inference is more akin to psychotherapy
than informal logic. People need to be aware of natural tendencies to exaggerate dreadful possibilities, and to ask themselves
how much evidence actually exists for what they fear. The result
should be increased ability to distinguish between arousal and
credibility. Hence critical thinking can be improved, one hopes,
by increasing awareness of the emotional roots of many inferences.
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5. Cognitive-Affective Maps
Such roots can be explored using a technique for analyzing the
emotional character of conflicts called cognitive-affective maps,
or CAMs (Thagard 2010b, Findlay and Thagard forthcoming;
Thagard 2011, forthcoming-a). Cognitive maps (also called concept maps) have been used for decades to display the conceptual
structure of important issues, but they do not display the large
emotional, value-laden component of most disputes. In areas
from social policy to environmental ethics, cognitive-affective
maps can be a useful tool for helping people to understand the
emotional roots of controversies. Psychologists use the term “affect” to encompass emotions, moods, and motivations.
Consider, for example, debates about whether people
ought to be vegetarians. It is no doubt possible to analyze such
debates as consisting of arguments pro and con, and when I
teach environmental ethics I consider and evaluate such arguments. But the reasons that lead people to become vegetarians
reside in systems of interconnected values more than sentential
structures. Figure 2 illustrates a pro-vegetarian view of the
world including both positive values (indicated by ovals) and
negative values (indicated by hexagons). The thickness of the
lines in the ovals and hexagons represents the strength of the
values. The supportive connections between concepts are indicated by solid lines, and the conflictive connections are indicated by dotted lines. By mapping the kinds of values shown in
figure 2, one gets an understanding of the emotional coherence
of the position, which can easily be contrasted with a more
mainstream view that eating meat is not only acceptable but desirable.
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Figure 2. Cognitive-affective map showing the emotional values that support being a vegetarian. Ovals are positive values,
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hexagons are negative values, solid lines are supportive connections, and dotted lines indicate incompatibility.

Figure 2 captures some of the main reasons why people
become vegetarians, including love of animals and concerns
with health, cost of eating, and maintenance of sustainable environments. Such CAMs provide a concise picture of the overall
values, both positive and negative, that support vegetarianism:
vegetarians tend to be people who care about animals, health,
and the environment, and dislike animal suffering, sickness, and
degrading the environment. Figure 2 can naturally be fleshed out
into a set of arguments for why one ought to be a vegetarian, but
such arguments conceal that for many people deciding to become a vegetarian is as much an emotional process as a purely
cognitive one (Rozin, Markwith, and Stoess 1987). Figure 2 illustrates how vegetarianism can be an emotionally coherent position. (For the theory of emotional coherence, see Thagard
2000, 2006).
CAMS are easy to draw, and are made even easier by a
software program called EMPATHICA that is freely available at
http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~pthagard/empathica.html.
This program encourages people to draw CAMs not only of
their own values but also of the values of people with whom
they disagree, with the aim of increasing empathy in the sense of
mutual understanding of emotional attitudes. The aims of critical
thinking should include not only improving the deliberations of
individuals but also improving social processes of conflict resolution, and EMPATHICA is intended to be a step in that direction.
In a discussion of political ideologies, I have recently extended the CAM methodology to include non-linguistic representations such as pictures and sounds (Thagard, forthcominga). A more emotionally evocative version of figure 2 could be
produced by adding pictures of valued objects such as cute baby
seals that are associated with love of animals, as well as pictures
of disgusting scenes such as slaughterhouses. Sounds are also
relevant, such as the haunting communications of whales in contrast to the painful wails of confined cows.
6. Scientific Literacy
Campaigns for scientific literacy are often led by scientists or
sociologists who are unaware of the psychological complexity
of scientific knowledge. In addition to basic information about
scientific theories, spreading scientific ways of thinking needs to
include an understanding of the nature of scientific concepts and
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other representations, as well as an appreciation of the motivational obstacles to science. As McCauley (2011) argues, religious thinking, which has existed as long as human civilization, is
much more natural for people than scientific thinking, which
only became systematic and sophisticated in the 17th century. I
think that scientific literacy is an important part of critical thinking, because it is impossible to make reasonable judgments
about such issues as the environment, technology, and economic
development without appreciation of the content and methods of
science.
The neuropsychological approach to critical thinking that I
have been advocating has an analogous contribution to make to
the project of scientific literacy, which needs to attend to: the
structure of scientific knowledge, the nature of scientific thinking, and the sources of resistance to science, either in general or
with respect to particular doctrines such as evolution and global
warming. Scientific knowledge consists not only of sets of linguistic propositions, but also of conceptual systems organized
by kind and part-whole relations (Thagard 1992). Moreover,
much scientific information is visual, as evident in the diagrams,
photographs, graphs, and maps found in many articles and textbooks. Finally, scientific method is not fully captured by linguistic prescriptions, but can also involve procedural knowledge
about how to use instruments and conduct experiments (Sahdra
and Thagard 2003). Hence the encouragement of scientific literacy needs to be based not on the study of critical thinking in the
tradition of informal logic, but rather on the cognitive science of
science, which has an extensive literature (e.g. Carey 2000, Chi
2005, Vosniadou 2008, Thagard forthcoming-b, Nersessian
2008).
7. Conclusion
Because of the distinguished history running from Aristotle to
Frege to Russell to contemporary formal logic, philosophers
have tended to take deductive reasoning as the central model for
inference. This model applies well to mathematical proofs, but
has little relevance for understanding how people acquire beliefs
and produce decisions. Research on informal logic comes closer
to capturing how reasoning operates in many domains besides
mathematics, but mostly retains the assumption that arguments
are serial and linguistic. Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest
that the study of argument is useless. Inferences do not have the
same psychological structure as arguments, but arguments are an
important part of communication of the evidential considera-
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tions that go into good inferences. Contrary to Mercier and
Sperber (2011), I do not think that reasoning has a primary biological function just to convince people. Rather, I see arguments
as a cultural development that may serve multiple purposes, including both the selfish goal of getting the agreement of others
and the social goal of transmitting information that everyone
needs for forming reliable beliefs and making good decisions.
The role of arguments in fixing beliefs and shaping decisions is
thus psychologically indirect but socially significant.
Hence educators concerned with improving critical thinking should by all means continue to help students understand the
difference between good and bad arguments. However, from a
neuropsychological perspective, they should view the understanding of arguments as only part of the laudable enterprise of
improving thought. Arguments provide a comprehensible way
of structuring and communicating evidence, but their psychological impact depends on translating them into the kinds of
multimodal, parallel, coherence-based considerations that produce inferences. Moreover, when arguments fail to convince, we
should rarely look for the explanation in terms of the traditional
fallacies, but rather in terms of the multitude of error tendencies
that psychological research has shown to operate in human
thinking. Similarly, the pursuit of scientific literacy needs to
adopt a psychologically rich view of the structure of scientific
knowledge and reasoning, along with a deeper understanding of
the cognitive and emotional barriers to good scientific thinking.
The poet Yeats said that education is not the filling of a pail, but
the lighting of a fire. I take this to mean that all learning requires
motivation, not just information acquisition. Correlatively, overcoming false beliefs and bad decisions is not the emptying of a
pail, but the extinguishing of some fires and the lighting of others. Critical thinking requires the motivation to use what is
known about cognitive and emotional mental processes to improve inferences about what to believe and what to do.
Appendix: 53 Error Tendencies
An error tendency is a pattern of thinking that is natural for people but frequently leads to errors in judgments about what to believe or decisions about what to do. The following list is from
my old course on critical thinking, which provides further notes,
http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/courses/phil145.html. The list derives
primarily from Gilovich (1991), Schick and Vaughan (1999),
Russo and Schoemaker (1989), and Bazerman (1994). It includes a few familiar fallacies, e.g. post hoc propter hoc, but
mostly is based on the psychological literature.
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A. 29 Error Tendencies That Affect Inferences About What To
Believe
Clustering illusion: Tendency to see non-existent patterns in
random events.
Representativeness: Tendency to use assessments of similarity
in statistical and causal reasoning.
Spurious causal theories: Tendency to use unsupported causal
theories in place of careful statistical and causal reasoning.
Regression fallacy: Tendency for people's predictions to ignore
that many statistical effects regress to the mean.
Vividness: Tendency for information that is particularly salient
or emotionally charged to be given undue influence.
Confirmation bias: Tendency to seek information that supports
your views and to ignore information that contradicts them.
The problem of absent data: Tendency to be over-confident
about conclusions despite the absence of relevant information.
Self-fulfilling prophecies: Tendency for expectations to affect
the world in ways that make the expectation true.
Gambler's fallacy: Tendency to view chance as a selfcorrecting process in which a deviation in one direction is
corrected in the opposite direction, e.g. expecting tails after a
string of heads.
Ambiguity: Tendency to interpret ambiguous (more than one
meaning) information in ways that fit our preconceptions.
Vagueness: Tendency to interpret vague (no clear meaning) information in ways that fit our preconceptions.
Asymmetric recall: Tendency to remember only one side of a
situation, e.g. the unpleasant side.
Overconfidence in your judgment: Tendency to fail to collect
key factual information because of being too sure of assumptions and opinions.
Insufficient anchor adjustment: Tendency to let an arbitrary
starting point bias a final answer.
Hindsight bias: Tendency to misremember your earlier attitudes
based on later knowledge of outcomes.
Motivated inference: Tendency to reach conclusions unduly
influenced by favorable personal goals.
Fear-driven inference: Tendency to reach conclusions because
of arousal produced by fear.
Sharpening and leveling in communication: Tendency to distort information in social contexts because of simplifying,
faulty memory, or reformulating what was told.
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Motivated communication distortions: Tendency to distort
information in social contexts for purposes of entertainment,
informativeness, or self-interest.
False consensus: Tendency to overestimate the extent to which
other people agree with you.
Groupthink: Tendency for people working in groups to reach
uncritical conclusions.
Pluralistic ignorance: Tendency not to realize that other people
have beliefs similar to yours.
Bogus authority: Tendency to believe authorities when they are
speaking outside their areas of expertise.
Intuition: Tendency to form beliefs based on a feeling or sixth
sense, without evaluation of evidence.
Mystical experience: Tendency to form beliefs on the basis of
an ineffable, personal, direct experience of reality.
Denying the evidence: Tendency to reject evidence rather than
to abandon a favored hypothesis with which the evidence
conflicts.
Hasty generalization: Tendency to make a judgment about a
group of things on the basis of evidence concerning only a
few members of that group.
Conjunction fallacy: Tendency to conclude that a conjunction
(A&B) is more probable than one of the conjuncts (A). This
occurs when the other conjunct (B) is highly representative or
available.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc: Tendency to infer that two events
are causally related just because one happened after the other.
B. 24 Error Tendencies That Affect Inferences About What To
Do
Plunging in: Beginning to gather information and reach conclusions without thinking the issue through or thinking about
how the decision should be made.
Frame blindness: Tendency to solve the wrong problem because your mental framework prevents you from seeing the
best options and important objectives.
Inconsistent weighting of costs: Tendency to understand costs
and losses differently in different situations, even when the
costs and losses should be the same.
Sunk costs: Tendency to make decisions on the basis of past
investment rather than expected future value.
Framing losses as more important than gains: Tendency to
become risk seeking in order to avoid losses.
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Bad metaphors or analogies: Tendency to frame a decision
using metaphors or analogies that give a misleading understanding of the problem situation.
Lack of frame control: Tendency to define the problem in only
one way or to be unduly influenced by the frames of others.
Overconfidence in judgment: Tendency to be too sure of assumptions and opinions, leading to decisions made without
collecting key information.
Shortsighted shortcuts: Tendency to make decisions based on
information acquired through lazy thinking strategies such as
availability, anchoring, and confirmation bias.
Shooting from the hip: Tendency to make decisions intuitively
based on information in your head rather than following a
systematic procedure for choosing such as a subjective linear
model.
Group failure: Tendency to assume that groups will make good
choices automatically and to fail to manage the group decision-making process in ways that will produce better decisions.
Fooling yourself about feedback: Tendency to fail to learn
from experience because of motivated inference or hindsight
bias.
Not keeping track: Tendency not to keep systematic records
that would make it possible to learn from past decisions.
Failure to audit your decision process: Tendency not to monitor your decision making in an organized fashion that would
identify errors.
Mythical fixed pie: Tendency in negotiation to assume that
your interests completely conflict with the other party's interests.
Framing in negotiation: Tendency to distort negotiation by
framing in terms of gains and losses.
Excessive escalation of conflict: Tendency to make increasingly extreme demands on the other party rather than seeking
a settlement.
Negotiator overconfidence: Tendency to overestimate the
strength of your own negotiating position.
Neglecting the cognitions of others; Tendency to focus on your
own interests and forget about the interests and plans of the
other party.
Neglecting fairness: Tendency to ignore issues of fairness and
concern for others.
Winner's curse: Tendency in competitive bidding for the winner to pay too high a price.
Risky shift: Tendency for individuals in groups to produce riskier decisions than would the individuals alone.
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Tragedy of the commons: Tendency for pursuit of individual
goals to lead to depletion of shared resources.
Failure to cooperate: Tendency to maximize individual interests instead of cooperating with others.
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